![]() I argue that the problem of convention is covered in his discourse on Saussure while the problematizing of the conversational maxims is a consequence of Derrida’s overall theory of meaning and communication. Derrida explicitly deals with the themes of intention (in his readings of Husserl and Austin) and context (again in his essay on Austin) while tackling the other two implicitly. I isolate four elements of pragmatics that distinguishes it from formal semantics: convention, intention, context, and conversational maxims (or, in Habermasian terminology, pragmatic presuppositions). Figures such as Austin, Searle, Grice, and Habermas are discussed so that the underlying themes of pragmatics can be made explicit. ![]() ![]() In order to accomplish this task, I first delve into the study of pragmatics and chart its development out of ordinary language philosophy. I have tried to prove Derrida’s assertion that his work overlaps and is consistent with pragmatics is correct. In a way, this program serves as a rebuttal to the critics of deconstruction who have maintained that Derrida is committed to the view that there is no such thing as meaning, thus allowing a text to be interpreted in any way that suits the whims of the reader. Jacques Derrida has often remarked that his own philosophy of language can be regarded as a sort of pragmatics, which he calls pragrammatology (pragmatics + grammatology). In conclusion, the qualitative and quantitative aspects of three key features of measurement are briefly explored: 1) the deconstructive display and exploration of significant anomaly, 2) the metaphorically and numerically reductive identification of new variables, and 3) the constructive application of technologically embodied sign-thing coordinations in research and practice. This paper explores the mathematical metaphysics of science, critically evaluates the often repeated maxim that fields of study are only as scientific as they are mathematical, and suggests that some forms of quantification are more mathematically astute, metaphysically informed, pragmatic, and effective than others. A metaphysically-informed theory of scientific method begins from the mathematical and hermeneutic implications of figure-meaning coordination. Following Wittgenstein's admonition that we pay attention to our nonsense, a kind of Socratic double vision is needed to simultaneously accept 1) that any meaningful discourse necessarily requires a significant degree of signifier-signified coordination, and 2) that an ideal degree of such coordination is never achieved in practice. This paper relates philosophy's metaphysical insistence on rigorous figure-meaning independence, and its own distrust of that insistence, to the potential for improved quantitative and qualitative methods in the sciences.
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